The word “activist” once described a narrow set of hedge funds that bought stakes in public companies and agitated for change. In 2026 it describes something broader: investors who can write a letter one week and a takeover check the next. Two filings from the past fortnight show both sides of the trade.
Loeb’s letter, in SEC form
On October 15, Third Point, Daniel Loeb’s firm, filed a Schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing a 5.8 percent stake in Strata Critical Medical, the company formerly known as Blade Air Mobility, which is headquartered on Third Avenue in Manhattan. Third Point reported owning 5,126,511 shares, acquired for about $24.5 million. The filing marks a shift from the passive Schedule 13G that Third Point had previously filed on the company, in August 2025: a 13D signals that the holder may seek to influence control.
The firm’s stated reasons, in Item 4 of the filing, are short and pointed. Third Point said it believes the stock is undervalued and that Strata’s business is strong “but not of a scale to support its current overhead.” It wrote that “management incentive options are not aligned with creating shareholder value.” And it said the company should explore strategic alternatives, including a potential sale, in a process “managed by a reputable investment banking firm.”
That last phrase is the one boards notice. Activists usually ask for a strategic review; specifying who should run it is a way of saying the investor does not trust management to run it themselves.
Strata, which provides time-critical transport of human organs and medical teams for transplant centers, is the business that remained after Blade sold its passenger operations. Its market value is modest by the standards of Loeb’s portfolio. But Third Point has a long record of targeting companies of every size, and a 13D from the firm, which manages its money from 55 Hudson Yards, tends to concentrate a board’s attention.
Loeb is one of the more distinctive figures of the buy side: a prolific writer of public letters, a serious collector of contemporary art, and a political donor who has backed candidates in both parties over the years. His letters, which once made headlines for their sharpness, have grown more measured over time. This one, at least in its SEC version, is a model of compression.
Elliott’s other hat
The second deal shows how far activist money has traveled from its origins. On October 15, CCC Intelligent Solutions, the Chicago-based software company that serves the automotive insurance industry, agreed to be acquired by a consortium led by GTCR that includes Elliott Investment Management. The deal values CCC at about $6.1 billion including debt, at $7.75 a share in cash, a 44 percent premium to the company’s unaffected closing price on July 9 and 59 percent over its 30-day average.
Elliott, which reported $80.3 billion in assets under management as of June 30 and is headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida, is best known as the most feared activist investor in the world. But it has spent the past decade building a private-equity business, and its private-equity arm now routinely partners with buyout firms or buys companies outright. “CCC is a highly durable franchise in vertical software – which AI will only make more valuable,” said David Kerko, Elliott’s head of global private equity, in the announcement.
The phrase about AI is worth noticing. Software valuations have been under pressure this year as investors weigh whether AI tools will erode the moats of incumbent vendors. Elliott and GTCR are betting the opposite: that companies sitting on proprietary data and embedded in customer workflows will be strengthened, not displaced. The premium they are paying is the size of that bet.
The transaction is expected to close in the first quarter of 2027. Morgan Stanley advised CCC; JPMorgan was lead financial adviser and arranger to GTCR, with Citi also advising; Gibson Dunn and Debevoise represented Elliott.
Two models, one season
Read together, the filings describe the two faces of the modern activist. Third Point is doing the classic work: buy a minority stake, publish a thesis, push for a sale. Elliott, in the CCC deal, is the buyer, applying the same analytical framework but owning the outcome.
There are good arguments for both. Defenders of classic activism point to academic studies finding that targeted companies often improve their operating performance, and to the discipline that the mere possibility of a 13D imposes on boards. Critics argue that activists favor short-term payouts over long-term investment and that the threat of a campaign distorts management’s priorities. Those arguments have been made by executives and investors across the political spectrum, and the evidence remains contested.
The private-equity model sidesteps some of that debate, because the investor that pushes for change also bears its cost. It introduces others, including the leverage and fees that come with any buyout.
For boards in New York and elsewhere, the practical lesson of the season is simpler. The investor who sends the letter may also be the investor who makes the bid. That changes how a company should answer the letter.
Featured image: 55 Hudson Yards, home of Third Point’s offices. Photo by Kidfly182 via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
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